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A. INTRODUCTION
In 1822, discussing the question whether paying another’s debt extinguishes it,
Baron Hume suggested that “it may be very long before such a question come to
trial”.1 Come to trial it eventually did in the Outer House case of Whitbread
Group Plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2).2 This article considers three important
questions in Scots law raised directly or indirectly by that case, namely:
(i) In what circumstances does Scots private law recognise the power of a third
party to extinguish another’s debt by making a payment to the creditor?
(ii) Where a third party, not being the debtor’s agent, has extinguished another’s
debt by an authorised or unauthorised payment, upon what ground, if any, is
the third party entitled to claim reimbursement of his expenditure from the
debtor?
(iii) What are the implications for the law of agency of a new doctrine of ad hoc
agency which has been developed by Lord Drummond Young inWhitbread
as a solution to at least the first of the foregoing questions and applied by
him in subsequent cases in other contexts?
(1) TheWhitbread case
Whitbread concerned among other things the question of whether a payment to
the landlord, Goldapple Ltd, of the rent of a public house in Edinburgh (the
Hogshead, 30 Bread Street) by a person, Fairbar Ltd, other than the tenant,
Whitbread Group Plc, was a valid payment of the rent due by the tenant and
as such operated to prevent an irritancy of the lease for non-payment of rent. The
quarterly payment of rent due on 10 May 2001 was not paid in time, because at
the time the pursuers were involved in the transfer of the assets of their pub
1 Baron David Hume, Lectures 1786-1822 vol III (ed G C H Paton, Stair Society vol 15, 1952) 16.
2 2005 SLT 281.
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and bars division to a third party, namely Fairbar Ltd, as part of an internal
reorganisation within a group of companies.3
On 27 May Fairbar sent to Goldapple’s bankers, the Royal Bank of Scotland,
a cheque in favour of Goldapple, for the amount of rent due, for crediting
to Goldapple’s account. The cheque was cleared on 3 June and credited to
Goldapple’s account. On 31 May Goldapple’s solicitors telephoned Whitbread’s
solicitors to inform them that the payment would be returned because it had
been received from the third party Fairbar rather than the tenant, Whitbread.
The judge found that the result of discussions between the parties’ agents was
an agreement that the Fairbar cheque should be returned by Goldapple and that
thereafter Whitbread should be given an opportunity to make payment of the
rent by another means. On Goldapple’s instructions, RBS returned the payment
to Fairbar, which received it on 11 June.When this cheque was repaid, Whitbread
made another attempt to pay the rent, on 12 June, but failed because of a mistake
in the account number. On 6 July Whitbread’s new attempt to pay the rent
(by CHAPS) also failed because by then Goldapple had instructed RBS not to
accept it.
Meantime Goldapple began proceedings to irritate the lease by serving a pre-
irritancy notice on 11 June and a notice of irritancy on 29 June, and by raising an
action of declarator of irritancy on 6 July. Whitbread reacted by raising an action
in the Court of Session of reduction of the two notices and declarator that the
lease continued to exist. Lord Drummond Young rejected Goldapple’s argument
that Fairbar’s payment of 27 May was not a valid payment of the rent due by
Whitbread. He held that Fairbar had paid the money as an ad hoc agent for
Whitbread.
Unfortunately, counsel omitted to cite to the court the main Scottish
authorities which do and should govern the situation of payment of another’s
debt,4 so that Lord Drummond Young felt bound (in his words) “to go back to first
principles”.5 In his impressive judgment he developed a novel theory of ad hoc
agency (which he defined as “an agency relationship that comes into existence for
the purpose of a single transaction only”)6 on which he has relied in subsequent
cases unrelated to payment of another’s debt.7 In Whitbread however he was
3 While the accounting and payment functions were being transferred, all payments were temporarily
halted.
4 Para 10.
5 Para 11.
6 Para 13.
7 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland
[2006] CSOH 197; John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Ltd [2007]
CSOH 117. These decisions are considered in Part C below.
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misled by counsel’s omission into thinking that this branch of Scots law was a
tabula rasa and a golden opportunity to develop the law by building on these
sources was missed.
(2) The factual circumstances held to raise an inference of
ad hoc agency
From the following facts Lord Drummond Young inferred that Fairbar was
acting as Whitbread’s ad hoc agent.8 First, though Fairbar was in occupation,
the obligation to pay the rent was Whitbread’s, not Fairbar’s. The tenant’s
interest had not been assigned, and could not be effectually assigned without
Goldapple’s consent as landlords. Second, the business transfer agreement
between Whitbread and and Fairbar specifically recognised that the obligation
to pay the rent remained with Whitbread and obliged Fairbar to reimburse
Whitbread for the rent.9 Third, the payment made on 27 May was clearly
intended to discharge Whitbread’s obligation to pay the rent.
Lord Drummond Young did not think that Fairbar had made the payment of
27May “in its own right” because the business transfer agreement recognised that
the obligation to pay rent remained Whitbread’s. The use of a Fairbar cheque
was administratively convenient, in that all debts of Whitbread’s pubs and bars
division payable after 10 May were paid using Fairbar cheques. The payments
themselves were effected on Fairbar’s behalf by employees of Whitbread. When
the arrangements governing such payments were looked at in the light of the
business transfer agreement, it was clear that the intention was that Fairbar
funds should be used to pay a Whitbread debt. The judge deemed this to be
wholly consistent with Fairbar’s acting as agent for Whitbread in respect of such
payment.
(3) The theory of ad hoc agency
Lord Drummond Young summarised his view of the law applicable as follows:10
[11] Although a number of authorities on the payment of debts were cited by counsel in
the course of their arguments, none appeared to govern the present situation. In these
8 Para 19, head 1.
9 This agreement purported to transfer “the beneficial interest” of Whitbread in the relevant assets
to Fairbar and to procure that “the legal interest” (sic) should be transferred in due course. Lord
Drummond Young commented at para 18 that: “The distinction between legal and beneficial interest is a
fundamental part of the English law of property, but it obviously forms no part of Scots law.” He pointed
out that there was no trust which alone in Scots law can create a beneficial interest. “Consequently the
tenant’s interest under the lease . . . was not transferred in any way by the business transfer agreement.”
10 Whitbread at paras 11 to 15.
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circumstances it is necessary to go back to first principles and analyse the requirements
of a valid payment . . .
[12]. . . I am of opinion that the following principles are relevant to the Fairbar cheque
of 27 May. First, it is necessary to keep in mind the elementary point that the purpose
of payment is normally to discharge a debt, and nothing more. Consequently, there
is generally no need to have regard to the wider context of the contract under which
the debt arises; to do so would in my view introduce unnecessary complexity into what
should be a very straightforward area of law. One exception exists, however; if the
person paying the debt attempts to attach conditions to his payment, it may then be
necessary to look at the wider contractual context.
[13] Secondly, it is common for payment to be made by someone other than the debtor
in the relevant obligation. This is particularly true of members of a family where, for
example, a husband may pay his wife’s debt, or a wife her husband’s. The same is true
of groups of companies, where it is not unusual for one company in the group to pay a
debt owed by another company to a person outside the group. The key to the analysis
of such cases lies in my opinion in the concept of ad hoc agency, that is to say, an
agency relationship that comes into existence for the purpose of a single transaction
only. Where, accordingly, one person makes payment of another’s debt, he normally
does so as the agent of the debtor for the purpose of that particular transaction, namely
the payment of the debt. That is in my opinion the natural inference from two facts,
(i) the existence of a debt owed by the debtor and (ii) the fact that payment is made in
order to discharge that particular debt. There is no reason to suppose from the mere
fact of payment that the person making payment does so on his own behalf; he has no
obligation to discharge. The obvious inference is accordingly that he makes payment
on behalf of the debtor. That creates the relationship of ad hoc agency.
[14] Thirdly, if the correct analysis is ad hoc agency, payment by the agent discharges
his principal’s debt. That follows from ordinary principles of the law of agency.
Fourthly, if the foregoing analysis is correct, there is no reason that the creditor should
be entitled to refuse payment by an ad hoc agent, because the agent’s act is attributed
to his principal; the payment must therefore be treated by the law as made by the
principal. The corollary of this proposition is that, if the creditor does in fact refuse
payment made by an ad hoc agent, the debtor cannot be prejudiced by such refusal.
What that means in practice is that the debtor must be given a further reasonable
opportunity to pay the debt. That is of great importance in the present case. It is critical,
however, that all that the ad hoc agent should do is pay the debtor; if he attempts to
attach conditions to his payment, the creditor may be entitled to refuse the payment.
Moreover, if the person making the payment purports to do so as principal rather than
agent, the inference of agency is negated, and the creditor might be entitled to refuse
payment.
[15] Fifthly, in some cases, of which the present is an example, the creditor may
be concerned that by accepting payment from someone other than the debtor he
may be regarded as recognising wider rights in the person who makes payment, by
personal bar or otherwise. In the present case, the defenders and their legal advisers
were concerned that they might, by accepting payment from Fairbar, be taken to
recognise Fairbar as the tenant under the lease. On the analysis of ad hoc agency no
such inference should be drawn, at least if the payment is unconditional and there is
nothing in the way that payment is made to suggest that the person making payment
is purporting to act as principal. Nevertheless, in such a case the creditor can protect
himself by accepting payment but writing either to the person making payment or to
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the debtor to negate any such inference from the acceptance of payment. In my opinion
an acceptance of payment can be made conditional in this way, just as a payment itself
may be conditional. If the other party rejects the condition, of course, the payment will
be a nullity.
The question arises whether the finding of ad hoc agency inWhitbreadwas on the
one hand ultimately a fiction or whether on the other hand it was constituted by
tacit agreement and represented commercial reality. We revert to that question
in Part C below.
B. PAYMENT OF ANOTHER’S DEBT
(1) The Scottish sources on payment of another’s debt
What are the sources on payment of another’s debt in Scots law? The primary
sources ought not to be in doubt. Under the fundamental institutional scheme
of our system of private law, the power of a third party to extinguish another’s
debt by unauthorised payment is, logically enough, part of the law on extinction
of obligations, and has been since Roman law.11 The law governing the right of
the third party to claim reimbursement of his expenditure from the debtor is
more complex. Depending on the precise facts, one or more of a number of
legal regimes can be involved including unjustified enrichment (recompense);
negotiorum gestio (management of another’s affairs); assignation ex lege of the
debt to the third party; or subrogation of the third party to the creditor’s rights;
and so forth. On the facts of Whitbread, the principal contenders are unjustified
enrichment or negotiorum gestio, whose different requirements are outlined
below.12
The most recent Scottish research on the third party’s power of payment is not
to be found in texts on “extinction of obligations” (where one would naturally look
for it) but in the linked context of unjustified enrichment and negotiorum gestio.13
The linkage arises because as Birks and Beatson once observed “the problems
which arise in the law of restitution where one person pays another’s debt cannot
be solved in the absence of a stable analysis of the effects of such a payment on
the relationship between the creditor and debtor”.14 In other words, to evolve
a set of principles on unjustified enrichment, or a negotiorum gestor’s claim, for
11 J Inst 3.29. For the details of the Scots law see B (2) and (3) below.
12 B (4) and (5) below.
13 Discussion Paper on Recovery of Benefits Conferred Under Error of Law (Scot Law Com DP No 95,
1993) vol 2 paras 2.157 ff; N R Whitty, “Negotiorum gestio”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial
Encyclopaedia vol 15 (1996) esp at para 97; H LMacQueen, “Payment of another’s debt”, in D Johnston
and R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002) 458.
14 P Birks and J Beatson, “Unrequested payment of another’s debt” (1976) 92 LQR 188 at 188.
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payment of another’s debt, one needs to know whether the unauthorised payment
extinguishes the debt and thereby enriches the debtor.
This article does not consider (except incidentally) cases where the third party
pays the creditor as a co-obligant or cautioner of the debtor thereby imposing
an obligation of relief on the latter, or where an insurer of the creditor pays
the creditor under a contract of indemnity and is subrogated to the creditor’s
action against the debtor. These involve distinct regimes with rules of their
own rather than the general principles of unjustified enrichment15 and require
separate treatment. Nor does this article consider the controversial issue whether
payment by a bank of its customer’s stopped cheque discharges the customer’s
debt.16 This is a special area of law since a bank pays its customer’s cheque in
order to implement its customer’s mandate and not in order to pay any debt
of its customer; for aught the bank knows or needs to know, there may be
no debt.17 Finally the article does not deal with unauthorised performance of
another’s obligation ad factum praestandum, which requires extra safeguards for
the creditor.
(2) The first main issue: the power of a third party to discharge
another’s debt
While there is a conflict of Scottish institutional authority on a third party’s
power to extinguish another’s debt,18 the weight of Scottish authority favours the
view (in consonance with the civilian tradition)19 that the payment of another’s
pecuniary debt discharges that debt if either the debtor or creditor agree and
certain conditions safeguarding the creditor’s autonomy are fulfilled.20 Following
Justinian’s institutional scheme,21 Bankton, Hume and Bell, together with
15 See e.g. C Mitchell, “Claims in unjustified enrichment to recover money paid pursuant to a common
liability” (2001) 5 EdinLR 186 at 197-207.
16 See e.g. R Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment, vol 1 (2003) paras 8.60-8.61; H L MacQueen,
“Payment of another’s debt” in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment (n 13) 458;
C Hugo, “Payment” in H L MacQueen and R Zimmermann (eds), European Contract Law: Scots and
South African Perspectives (2006) 230 at 242-246.
17 For a classic exposition of this point see Govender v Standard Bank of South Africa 1984 (4) SA 392
(C) at 398-399 per Rose-Innes J. On the actual outcome cf B & H Engineering v First National Bank
of South Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 279 (A); Barclays Bank Ltd v Simms [1980] 1 QB 677.
18 See the authorities cited at nn 22-26 below.
19 R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Traditions (1990) 752;
D 3.5.38; D 46.3.53; J Inst 3.29.
20 See Whitty (n 13) at para 97, cited by Lord President Rodger in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London
Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123 at 1144L-1145A; Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd v
Ross 1995 SLT (Sh Ct) 103, applying Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Hall Russell & Co Ltd 1988 SLT 874 at
878B-E per Lord Goff of Chieveley. See, however, the correction thereof by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry
in Caledonia North Sea Ltd at 1144 and 1145.
21 J Inst 3.29 (quibus modis obligatio tollitur) (the modes by which an obligation is extinguished).
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Rankine’s edition of Erskine’s Principles, all deal with the power to extinguish
another’s debt in passages on liberation from or extinction of obligations22 –
precisely where one would naturally expect to find it. Expressly citing Justinian’s
Institutes,23 Bankton24 and Bell25 state that a third party can by an unauthorised
payment of another’s debt extinguish that debt whether the debtor knows of it or
not or (at least in some circumstances) even against his will. It is true that Kames
and Hume took a different view,26 but they did not cite any Scottish authority
and have had no discernible influence on the development of this branch of law.
The most authoritative statement of the rule is that of Bell:27
Payment, to the effect of extinguishing the obligation, may be made not only by the
debtor himself, but by anyone acting for the debtor: or even by a stranger, where
the debt is pecuniary, and due, and demanded;28 or where any penal effect may arise
from delay; or where the creditor has no interest in demanding performance by the
proper debtor. The debtor cannot prevent any stranger from paying and demanding an
assignation if the creditor chooses to grant it. But the creditor cannot be compelled to
grant an assignation, unless the debtor shall consent, and the granting of the assignation
shall not interfere with any other interest of the creditor himself.
This passage was applied by Lord Anderson in Reid v Lord Ruthven29 although
in that case the basis of the third party’s power was said to be negotiorum gestio.
Bell’s rule is very relevant to the Whitbread case because it is (or was until that
case) trite law that the general rules on extinction of obligations apply to payment
of rent.30 Bell’s rule is followed by Rankine’s editions of Erskine’s Principles, a
22 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights (1751-1753;
reprinted by the Stair Society, vols 41-43, 1993-1995) 1.24.1; Hume, Lectures vol III (n 1) ch 10; Bell,
Prin § 557; J Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 21st edn by J Rankine (1911) 509. Kames is
different because the scheme of his Principles of Equity (n 26) is not institutional.
23 J Inst 3.29 (R W Lee’s translation): “Every obligation is determined by the performance of what is
owed, or if some one with the consent of the creditor performs something else in its place. It makes
no difference who performs, whether the debtor himself, or another on his behalf; for the debtor is
released from his obligation if another person performs, whether the debtor knows of it or not, and
even against his will”.
24 Bankton, Institute (n 22) 1.24.2: “payment may be made for one that is ignorant of it, or even against
his will, because he cannot hinder the creditor to take his payment where he can get it”.
25 Prin § 557. The reference to Justinian’s Institutes was inserted by Bell’s editor (Sheriff W Guthrie) in
the 8th (1885) and subsequent editions, and not by Bell himself who in the last edition which he edited
personally (4th, 1839) relied on three Scots cases cited in n 46 below.
26 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Principles of Equity, 5th edn (1825) 330-331; Hume, Lectures vol III
(n 1) 16-17, both analysed in the Scottish Law Commission’s Discussion Paper on Recovery of Benefits
Conferred Under Error of Law (n 13) vol 2 para 2.160.
27 Bell, Prin § 557.
28 Here, Bell cites J Inst 3.30; the correct reference is 3.29.
29 (1918) 55 S L Rep 616 at 618.
30 See e.g. J Rankine, The Law of Leases in Scotland, 3rd edn (1916) 315; G CHPaton and J G S Cameron,
Landlord and Tenant (1967) 100; J Sinclair, “Landlord and tenant”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair
Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 13 (1992) para 229.
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standard student text till the 1920s:31
Obligations may be dissolved by performance. . . The most usual case is an obligation
for a sum of money which is extinguished by payment. Payment in full by the true
debtor to the true creditor has that effect. Usually it is immaterial that the payment
has been made by some one else than the true debtor, especially if a demand has been
made, or a penalty would otherwise be incurred. But in exceptional cases the creditor
may have an interest to enforce payment by the debtor himself.
Some modern treatments are skimpy or inadequate but not inconsistent with
the foregoing.32 Oddly the rule and even the issue were overlooked by some
important texts (including Gloag,McBryde andWilson on Debt). It was however
described by the Scottish Law Commission in 199333 and in the Stair Memorial
Encyclopaedia section on negotiorum gestio in 1995.34 It was ably discussed in an
essay by Hector MacQueen published in 200235 and clearly stated in the context
of Extinction of Obligations in the most recent edition ofGloag and Henderson in
terms similar to that of Bell,36 but culminating in the punch-line: “In sum, third-
party performance can only be declined where both creditor and debtor object to
it”.37
It should not be thought that this rule is a relic of a bygone age. It is the general
rule in civilian38 and mixed39 systems,40 and in such European documents as the
DCFR and PECL.41As Lord President Rodger pointed out in the Caledonia
North Sea Ltd case, under English law payment by “a volunteer” does not
31 Erskine, Principles, 21st edn (n 22) 509.
32 See e.g. C Sandeman, “Payment”, in Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland vol 11 (1931) para 368: “a
third party, on making payment of a debt, is entitled to demand from the creditor all the means at his
disposal of obtaining relief from the true debtor”; D M Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, 1st
edn (1970) vol 1 at 602: “If [the creditor] is pressing for payment, he is bound to accept payment on
behalf of the debtor from any third party who has an interest to intervene”.
33 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Recovery of Benefits Conferred Under Error of Law
(n 13) vol 2 para 2.157 ff.
34 Whitty (n 13) para 97.
35 MacQueen (n 16). See also Hugo (n 16) at 242-246.
36 In a passage edited by Hector MacQueen. See W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland,
12th edn (2007) para 3.22.
37 Ibid.
38 See e.g. in Germany, § 267 BGB; the French Code Civil art 1236; the Italian Codice Civile art 1180.
39 See e.g. F du Bois (ed),Wille’s Principles of South African Law, 9th edn (2007) 817 (D Visser); Quebec
Civil Code art 1555; Louisiana Civil Code art 1855.
40 D Friedmann and N Cohen, “Payment of another’s debt”, in P Schlechtriem (ed), Restitution – Unjust
Enrichment and Negotiorum Gestio, vol X ch 10 of The International Encyclopaedia of Comparative
Law (1991) para 9. See also ibid para 3.
41 C von Bar and E Clive (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), full edition (2009) vol I, III.–2.107(1). See also O Lando and
H Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, parts I and II (2000) art 7:106, which is in similar
terms but limited to contractual obligations. The notes to the article state that the Scottish law on
performance without the debtor’s consent is probably the same as the English. But now the notes to
66 the edinburgh law review Vol 15 2011
discharge the debt unless adopted by the debtor.42 Famously, this is one of the
fault-lines dividing the civil law and common law traditions.43 There is no sign
that the civilian and mixed systems wish to give this up; rather some English legal
commentators argue that the English approach should be liberalised.44
(3) Safeguards for creditor and debtor in cases of payment of another’s
pecuniary debt
(a) Safeguards for the creditor
As mentioned above, payment of another’s debt is one of the rare categories
of “imposed enrichment” in the civil law tradition generally and Scots law in
particular. However, the contrast with the English law tradition shows that there
must be strong policy reasons to outweigh the loss of individual autonomy
involved and adequate control devices to guard against unjust obtruding of
unwanted benefits and officious intermeddling. The need for safeguards is less
strong in cases of payment of another’s pecuniary debt than in performance of
an obligation ad factum praestandum but safeguards are still necessary. In this
article we are only concerned with pecuniary debts.45 Bell’s Principles § 557
does not uphold a completely unfettered power to discharge another’s debt.
On the contrary, in a masterpiece of compression, Bell lays down briefly four
important requirements which have to be satisfied before a stranger’s payment
will extinguish another’s debt namely:
(i) where it is pecuniary, due and demanded;46
(ii) where any penal effect may arise from delay;
(iii) where the creditor has no interest in demanding performance by the proper
debtor; and
III.–2.107(1) in the DCFR full edition state (at note 4) that the Scots law is “probably” the same as
many continental systems (citing Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland (n 36) para 3.22) adding
“although the Scottish law in this area is unclear”.
42 Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT 1123 at 1144L-1145A.
43 See e.g. Friedmann and Cohen (n 40).
44 See e.g. Birks and Beatson (n 14); D Friedmann, “Payment of Another’s Debt” (1983) 99 LQR 534. Cf
Greenwood v Bennett [1973] QB 195.
45 Stronger safeguards for the creditor apply in obligations ad factum praestandum. See e.g. Transco plc
v Glasgow City Council 2005 SLT 958, discussed by N RWhitty, “Transco plc v Glasgow City Council:
developing enrichment law after Shilliday” (2006) 10 EdinLR 113.
46 The word “pecuniary” is presumably not intended to mean that only money debts can be discharged by
a third party’s intervention. On performance of another’s obligation ad factum praestandum see Varney
(Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Town Council 1974 SC 245; Transco plc v Glasgow City Council 2005 SLT
958 and Whitty (n 45) esp at 120-121. Cf Lawrence Building Co Ltd v Lanark County Council 1978
SC 30.
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(iv) where either the creditor or debtor concurs, or at least does not object, to
the third party’s payment.
Multum in parvo.47 These requirements are safeguards mainly for the creditor,
and appear to be cumulative in the sense that all of them must be satisfied before
the third party’s payment will operate a discharge of the debt. In some cases
the judges tend to conflate analysis of the power to pay another’s debt, which
concerns extinction of the debtor’s obligation, with analysis of the payer’s right
to require an assignation of the debt, which concerns the third party’s right of
reimbursement from the debtor. It is the first aspect which concerns us here. It
is well established that the right to demand an assignation on making payment
of another’s debt extends beyond the case of a cautioner or co-obligant with a
right of relief to include a third party who acquires a right of recompense against
the debtor on paying his debt without obligation to do so.48 It is thought that the
latter cases afford good authority for the existence of a third party’s power to pay
another’s debt, though in some cases it is difficult to determine whether judicial
dicta as to the limits of the right to demand an assignation are also intended to be
limits on the third party’s power to pay another’s debt and vice versa.
The first safeguard for the creditor’s autonomy is that the debt must be
“pecuniary, due, and demanded”. So for instance in Smith v Gentles49 Lord
Mackenzie referred to an unidentified earlier case where the Second Division:
. . . took this distinction – that a third party was not entitled to say to a creditor, here is
payment of your debt, assign your security to me; but that, where the creditor chose
to attempt to enforce payment by execution, he might then be compelled to assign his
security to a third party paying the debt. A third party is not entitled to say to a creditor,
I want an investment; give me yours – here is payment of your debt. While a creditor
is content to retain his debt, he may do so; but where he seeks to enforce payment, it
is a different case. . .
InWhitbread, the rent was indeed pecuniary, due and demanded.
The second of Bell’s requirements safeguarding the creditor’s autonomy is
“where any penal effect may arise from delay”. Such are cases where delay in
payment will result in the execution of diligence or sequestration in bankruptcy
47 All these requirements are present in the 4th edition of the Principles (1839) which cites only three
scantily reported cases: McGillivray v McArthur (1826) 4 S 697; Austin v Grant (1827) 5 S 701 and
Rainnie v Milne (1822) 1 S 355. See n 25 above.
48 See e.g. Smith v Gentle (1844) 6 D 1164; Cunningham’s Trs v Hutton (1847) 10 D 307; Russell’s Tr v
Mudie (1857) 20 D 125 (postponed bondholder); Fleming v Burgess (1867) 5 M 856; W M Gloag and
J M Irvine, Law of Rights in Security (1897) 56-58.
49 (1844) 6 D 1164.
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or the enforcement of a hypothec50 or voluntary security,51 or the lapse of
an insurance policy through non-payment of premiums,52 or the incurring of
remedies for breach of contract, and so forth. In Whitbread, the result of the
landlord’s refusal to accept the third party’s tender of payment would have been
as drastic a civil penalty as one can find in Scots private law, namely, irritancy of
the lease. So this requirement was also well satisfied. There are precedents in old
cases of 1744 and 1841 where it was held that a landlord was bound to accept a
tender of arrears of rent by a third party and to grant a discharge on receiving
payment of the arrears though he was not bound to assign his right of hypothec
to the third party.53
The third safeguard for the creditor’s autonomy mentioned by Bell was “where
the creditor has no interest in demanding performance by the proper debtor”. In
Whitbread, subject to one proviso, Goldapple had no interest in receiving the
rent fromWhitbread rather than from Fairbar other than the interest in irritating
the lease and, as we know from the second requirement, that is not a legitimate
interest which can be taken into account so as to bar discharge of the debt by
the third party. The proviso is that the landlords Goldapple were concerned that
they might, by accepting payment from Fairbar, be taken to recognise Fairbar as
the tenant under the lease. Lord Drummond Young held that, under his theory
of ad hoc agency, no such inference should be drawn, at least if the tender of
payment is unconditional; that the creditor could protect himself by accepting
payment subject to a condition (which could be notified in a letter to the third
party or debtor) expressly negating such an inference; and that if the other
party were to reject the condition attached by the creditor to his acceptance,
the payment would be a nullity.54 If the creditor were unjustifiably to refuse to
accept the third party’s tender of payment, the debtor could not be prejudiced
thereby which would mean in practice that the debtor must be given a further
50 Cf Guthrie and McConnachy v Smith (1880) 8 R 107.
51 See e.g. Tod v Dunlop (1838) 1 D 231.
52 See e.g. Brown v Meek’s Trs (1896) 4 SLT 46;Wylie’s Exix v McJannet (1901) 4 F 195; Edinburgh Life
Assurance v Balderston (1909) 2 SLT 323 (recompense); Graham’s Executors v Fletcher’s Executors
(1870) 9 M 298 (negotiorum gestio).
53 A v B (1744) Mor 6228 (landlord having a hypothec for rent arrears not bound to assign it to a third
party creditor of the tenant executing a poinding of the tenant’s goods but only to discharge the rent
arrears on payment by the third party); Graham v Gordon (1841) 2 Rob 251, (1842) 4 D 903. Both
cases are explained and applied in Guthrie and McConnachy v Smith (1880) 8 R 107 at 112-113 per
Lord Mure; see also at 117 per Lord Shand. In Wood v Northern Reversion Co (1848) 11 D 254 Lord
Fullerton (at 259) implied that if the interest due on a bond had been paid by any person acting in the
name or on behoof of the debtor, the debt in regard to that interest would have been extinguished.
54 Whitbread at para 15.
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reasonable opportunity to pay the debt, a matter of great importance where there
are deadlines for payment as in theWhitbread case.55
It is submitted that these just and practical rules, designed by Lord
Drummond Young to strike a fair and reasonable balance between the interests of
all the parties, could and should be seen as a manifestation of the third safeguard
described in § 557 of Bell’s Principles rather than of a new doctrine of ad hoc
agency. This safeguard is very important in some commercial contexts, such as
in a construction contract. Under the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) forms, the
effect of one of the standard clauses is to prohibit the employer from assigning
the benefit (including the right to particular debts) to a third party.56
Bell’s fourth safeguard is that either the creditor or debtor concur, or at least
do not object, to the third party’s payment. In Whitbread, the debtor Whitbread
concurred in the payment by the third party, Fairbar.
It follows that all the classic requirements of Bell’s test were satisfied in that
case so that the debt was extinguished by Fairbar’s payment on 27 May 2001.
Accordingly it was at best unnecessary to develop a doctrine of ad hoc agency to
reach the same result.
(b) Safeguards for the debtor
The main safeguards for the debtor arise on the assumption that he will become
liable to reimburse the third party intervener. First, suppose the third party is
not the debtor’s friend but an enemy. If this vague objection constituted a serious
risk, however, it would long ago have precluded the assignability of debts. But it
does not have that effect57 and accordingly the objection does not seem strong
enough to require a safeguard. Secondly, suppose the debtor has a defence or
counterclaim or a right to suspend contractual performance which he loses on
payment of his debt. Where the debtor has a defence, he can resist the third party
payer’s claim for reimbursement (recompense) on the ground that he was not
enriched by the payment. This might involve determining whether the defence
is made out in proceedings in which the payer was not a party.58 Where the
55 Para 14.
56 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 especially at 103H-109D
per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. We are grateful to Lord Drummond Young for drawing this point to
our attention. On the cross-border differences in the construction of clauses in contracts prohibiting
assignation, see R G Anderson, Assignation (2008) para 11.44.
57 Though it may affect the assignability of securities: see Fleming v Burgess (1867) 5 M 856 at 861 per
Lord Neaves, stating that a creditor is not bound to assign a heritable security to anyone who tenders,
adding: “Such a rule might result in great injustice to the debtor by giving a private enemy the power
of acquiring a weapon to be used against him. . . ”
58 Cf J Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (1991) 203.
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debtor can plead a counterclaim against the original creditor, it must in principle
still be pleadable in any enrichment-based proceedings by the third party for
reimbursement so that the latter is to that extent subrogated to the position of
the original creditor.59 The procedural details of this require exploration. Finally,
some authorities hold that a third party can discharge another’s debt even against
the debtor’s express wishes and claim reimbursement.60 In the South African
Taylam case,61 a restaurateur who had paid a debt due by a previous owner of
his restaurant to his wholesale supplier, in order to secure the continuation of
supplies, was held enitled to recover the debt from the previous owner. The case
is controversial62 but the result seems just in the particular circumstances.
(4) Second main issue: claims by third party payer against debtor under
unjustified enrichment, negotiorum gestio, assignation or subrogation
Assuming that the third party’s payment has discharged another’s pecuniary
debt without the debtor’s authority, the main bases upon which the third party
can claim reimbursement of his expenditure from the debtor are unjustified
enrichment or negotiorum gestio.63 These have different requirements.
In unjustified enrichment “the pursuers must show that the defenders have
been enriched at their expense, that there is no legal justification for the
enrichment and that it would be equitable to compel the defenders to redress
the enrichment”.64 There are three elements in the cause of action: (1) the
enrichment of the defender; (2) at the pursuer’s expense; and (3) no legal
justification for the enrichment. The fourth element is actually a defence under
which the defender may escape decree if he establishes that it would be
inequitable for the court to compel redress.65 It is submitted that this test has
superseded the older and less authoritative five-point Varney test of liability for
recompense.66 To continue to apply the latter test is a recipe for confusion and
59 Ibid.
60 J Inst 3.29; Bankton, Institute (n 22) 1.24.2; Bell, Prin § 557 (“The debtor cannot prevent any stranger
from paying and demanding an assignation if the creditor chooses to grant it”.)
61 Standard Bank Financial Services Ltd v Taylam (Property) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 383 (C).
62 See e.g. C J Maxwell, “The protesting dominus: a reconsideration in the light of German law” (2009)
20 Stellenbosch LR 517; D Visser, Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 584-587.
63 Whitty (n 13) at para 97; Graham’s Executors v Fletcher’s Executors (1870) 9 M 298; Reid v Lord
Ruthven (1918) 55 SLR 616 at 618 per Lord Anderson.
64 Dollar Land (Cumbernauld) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC (HL) 90 at 98H-I per Lord Hope of
Craighead, quoting Lord Rodger in the same case (1996 SC 331 at 353D).
65 Compagnie Commerciale Andre SA v Artibell Shipping Co Ltd 2001 SC 653 at 668I-669A per Lord
Macfadyen.
66 Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Town Council 1974 SC 245. See e.g. the obiter dicta of Lord Hodge in
Macadam v Grandison [2008] CSOH 53 at para 35 and Robertson Construction Central Ltd v Glasgow
Metro LLP [2009] CSOH 71 at para 18. See also Whitty (n 45).
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would be inconsistent with the decision in Shilliday v Smith67 that recompense is
merely a remedy and not a substantive cause of action. Payment of another’s debt
is one of three categories in which a claim lies for “imposed enrichment”, the
other two being the bona fide possessor’s improvement of another’s property and
negotiorum gestio68 though the latter is not always or even usually an enrichment
claim.69
The prerequisites for negotiorum gestio are that (1) the management must be
of another’s affairs; and (2) unauthorised; (3) the principal (dominus negotii) must
be absent, or unaware of the management, or incapax; (4) the gestor must act to
benefit the principal intending to donate his labour but to recover his expenses;
and (5) the management must have been useful when originally carried out.70
In negotiorum gestio the measure of the gestor’s recovery is the amount of his
expenses (if useful, at least initially) which may exceed the principal’s enrichment.
Payment of another’s debt is one of the most common and characteristic types of
negotiorum gestio.71
It seems that the remedy of assignation or subrogation may be available to a
third party who pays another’s debt, even though the third party is not a cautioner
or co-obligant of the debtor. It has advantages for a third party because it may give
the third party a security in ranking on the debtor’s estate.This raises a notorious
conundrum: how can the debt be discharged by the payment and at the same
time be kept alive so as to be assignable either by writing or by operation of law?
The theory stated by Bell for cautioners and co-obligants is as follows:72
Payment made by one interested in the debt (as co-obligant or surety) will take away
the right of the creditor but will not extinguish the debt of the principal obligant. The
person so paying is entitled to an assignation, to the effect of operating his relief.
There is a view that this theory may also apply to payments by third parties
who are not cautioners or co-obligants but “strangers” because in certain
circumstances they are entitled to an assignation of the creditor’s rights.73 But
that seems inconsistent with the third party’s right of recourse against the debtor
67 1998 SC 725.
68 See e.g. Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 12th edn (n 36) paras 25.16-25.19 and 25.24 ff.
69 On the limitation of negotiorum gestio to enrichment in cases of “impure gestio” seeWhitty (n 13) paras
137-141.
70 Ibid para 95.
71 Ibid paras 97-98. On the question whether unjustified enrichment (recompense) is subsidiary to
negotiorum gestio see Whitty (n 45) 128-129.
72 Bell, Prin § 558, approved in Caledonia North Sea Ltd v London Bridge Engineering Ltd 2000 SLT
1123 at 1144 per Lord President Rodger.
73 Bell, Prin § 558 cites Guthrie and McConnachy v Smith (1880) 8 R 107, which did not involve a
cautioner or co-obligant. See Friedmann and Cohen (n 40) and Mitchell (n 15).
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based on unjustified enrichment (recompense). As Friedmann and Cohen point
out, “[c]onceptually the assignee, who becomes the new creditor, is the owner
of the original debt, while the payor who, upon discharging the debt is entitled
to reimbursement, becomes a new creditor and is the owner of a new debt”.74
Various theories such as “reviving subrogation”, which lie outside this article, may
be advanced.75
The question of Whitbread’s recompense of Fairbar for paying Whitbread’s
debt did not arise in the Whitbread case. One would hope that if that issue had
arisen it would have been resolved by principles of unjustified enrichment rather
than on the basis of an agent’s right to reimbursement from his principal under
an implied contract of ad hoc agency.
(5) Precedents where third party’s payment to creditor was reimbursed
by debtor
Sometimes the third party’s purpose in paying another’s debt is to protect the
interest of the debtor, sometimes to protect the third party’s own interest, and
sometimes the motives are mixed. InWhitbread, Fairbar’s motives may well have
been mixed. The results, however, are the same, as the following precedents (in
all of which the third party is neither cautioner nor co-obligant and pays without
contractual obligation or intention of donation) show.
(a) Third party’s payment of another’s debt to protect the debtor’s interest
In the following cases the primary aim of the payment was to protect the debtor’s
interest. (a) The third party pays (or provides) aliment to an alimentary creditor
and claims recompense under unjustified enrichment or reimbursement under
negotiorum gestio from the alimentary debtor whose obligation of aliment he has
discharged.76 Before the advent of social security and the narrowing of the class of
alimentary debtors, this was a common case. (b) The third party provides aliment
for a pauper who is entitled to poor relief and recovers its cost from the liable poor
law authority.77 (c) The third party, the employer of a worker in a foreign country,
on repatriating him, discharged his debts incurred there and claimed recompense
74 Friedmann and Cohen (n 40) para 16.
75 See Mitchell (n 15).
76 Reid v Robertson (1868) 6 SL Rep 77; Stevenson v McDonald’s Tr 1923 SLT 451;Mackenzie’s Tutrix v
Mackenzie 1928 SLT 649; Scottish Law Commission, Aliment and Financial Provision (Scot Law Com
Consultative Memorandum No 22, 1976) para 2.80.
77 Howie v Kirk Session of Arbroath (1800) Mor sv “Poor” App x 1;Malvie v Mackenzie (1859) 1 Guthrie
400. The factual situation is old but it illustrates the common law principle.
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from him.78 (d) The third parties pay back to the lender the amount of a loan due
by their employee, recover some of the loan by deduction from his salary and then
sue for the outstanding balance after the employee leaves their employment.79
(e) A trustee who pays in a personal capacity from his own pocket premiums due
upon the trust estate’s insurance policy is entitled to recompense to the extent
that the estate is lucratus by the trustee’s expenditure. In this type of case the
analogy of the trustee’s lien under English law was rejected: “The only ground,
according to our law, on which a trustee so acting can recover his advances, is
that of recompense, which implies that his right to recover depends on his being
able to show that the estate is lucratus by his expenditure”.80 Likewise a solicitor
pays in a personal capacity from his own pocket premiums due upon his client’s
insurance policy.81 All these cases proceed on the premise that a third party can
discharge another’s debt by unauthorised payment.
(b) Third party’s payment to protect his or her own interest
In the following cases the third party’s unauthorised payment was made to protect
his or her own interest. (a) There are cases where if the debt is not discharged,
the third party may lose a proprietary or possessory right or expectancy, as
where a wife recovers recompense in respect of premiums advanced by her to
trustees to keep up an assurance policy on her husband’s life, over which she
has a spes successionis.82 (b) Then there is the case where a third party, the
ordinary creditor of a tenant, tenders payment of the tenant’s arrears of rent to
the landlord (in order, for example, to disburden the tenancy of the landlord’s
hypothec prior to the creditor executing an ordinary poinding of the invecta et
illata). The landlord is bound to grant a discharge on payment of the arrears
though he is not bound to assign his right of hypothec to the creditor.83 A classic
case is where a sub-tenant pays the rent of the principal tenant in order to
prevent his own consequential removing. (c) Likewise in the feudal system a
78 Duncan v Motherwell Bridge and Engineering Co 1952 SC 131 at 147, 157 and 159.
79 Lanarkshire Health Board v Banafaa 1987 SLT 229 (where it seems to have been assumed that the
contract of loan should be assigned from the original creditor to the pursuers).
80 Brown vMeek’s Trs (1896) 4 SLT 46 at 46 per Lord StormonthDarling (action of recompense dismissed
as premature but otherwise semble competent and relevant). The trustee may have a possessory lien
over the policy but only quantum lucratus est the trust estate; cf Edinburgh Life Assurance v Balderston
(1909) 2 SLT 323 (analogy with bona fide possessor making mistaken improvements).
81 Wylie’s Executrix v McJannet (1901) 4 F 195. See alsoGraham’s Executors v Fletcher’s Executors (1870)
9 M 298 (negotiorum gestio).
82 Morgan v Morgan’s JF 1922 SLT 247, cited in Varney (Scotland) Ltd v Lanark Town Council 1974 SC
245 at 248-249 per Lord Stott. See also Brown v Meek’s Trs (1896) 4 SLT 46.
83 A v B (1744) Mor 6228; Graham v Gordon (1841) 2 Rob 251, (1842) 4 D 903; explained and applied in
Guthrie and McConnachy v Smith (1880) 8 R 107 at 112-113 per Lord Mure.
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third party was entitled to tender payment of a vassal’s arrears of feuduty to the
feudal superior and the superior was bound to grant a discharge of the arrears
but was not bound to assign the superior’s hypothec or other remedies to the
third party.84 (d) Where a life assurance policy insuring a husband’s life for the
benefit of his wife was purportedly assigned to two creditors of the husband in
security of his debts to them, and it subsequently turned out that the assignation
in security was void, it was held that the purported assignees were entitled, under
the principle of recompense, to repayment, out of the policy proceeds, of the
premiums which they had paid in good faith to keep the life policy in force.
Lord Mackenzie drew an analogy with recompense for a bona fide possessor for
improving another’s property.85 But the assignees’ payment of premiums might
have been characterised as payment of debts due by the trustees under the
policy which, like a bona fide possessor’s improvements, is a form of “imposed
enrichment”. Normally however the third party’s payment is not mistaken. None
of these cases assumes the existence of ad hoc agency.
C. WHITBREAD AND RELATED ISSUES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF AGENCY LAW
(1) Whitbread as the first step in the creation of a new doctrine
Whitbread is the first case in which the phrase “ad hoc agency” has been used:
it is not a term of art in Scots agency law. In the two years following the case,
Lord Drummond Young applied the same concept in two other cases: Laurence
McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National
Library of Scotland86 and John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster
Properties Scotland Ltd.87 Although the facts of each of the three cases differ, a
common thread unites them. In each the problem facing the pursuer was caused
by the doctrine of the separate legal personality of companies.
(a) Laurence McIntosh Ltd
In the first of these cases the pursuer, Laurence McIntosh Ltd, was a joinery
business, which originally traded as a partnership called Laurence McIntosh
& Sons. In 1998 the partnership had entered into a subcontract (“the Works
Contract”) with the principal contractor Balfour Beatty, in terms of which
84 Guthrie and McConnachy v Smith (1880) 8 R 107.
85 Edinburgh Life Assurance Co v Balderston (1909) 2 SLT 323 at 326.
86 [2006] CSOH 197.
87 [2007] CSOH 117.
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McIntosh agreed to carry out joinery work in the refurbishment of the National
Library of Scotland. Balfour Beatty in turn were employed by the Trustees of the
National Library of Scotland under the main contract. After the Works Contract
had been entered into, in 2000, a company called Laurence McIntosh Ltd was
incorporated. The intention was that the company would take over the business
of the partnership, and the company did indeed act as contracting party in new
contracts. The rights and liabilities of the partnership, however, were not validly
transferred to the new company. Rather, performance of most of their contracts
being substantially completed, contractual counterparties were simply sent letters
containing details of a new bank account in the name of Laurence McIntosh Ltd
into which any payments under existing contracts were to be made.
A dispute arose in which Laurence McIntosh Ltd challenged various steps
taken under the Works Contract and the Management Contract. When Laurence
McIntosh Ltd raised an action against both Balfour Beatty and the Trustees of
the National Library of Scotland, they faced a significant difficulty: because the
newly incorporated company was not a party to the Works Contract, they had no
title to sue under that contract. Realising that a significant error had occurred, an
assignation transferring the whole right, title and interest in the Works Contract
from the partnership to the new company was executed and intimated to Balfour
Beatty. Its effect was purportedly backdated to April 2000. Significantly, the
execution of this assignation post-dated the raising of the action by Laurence
McIntosh Ltd.
Lord Drummond Young held that the assignation had not retrospectively
cured the company’s lack of title to sue.88 All was not lost for the company,
however. Lord Drummond Young applied his solution of ad hoc agency. This
allowed him to treat the newly formed company as the agent of the partnership.
All rights under the Works Contract therefore remained with the partnership.
Acting as agent, the company had carried out a number of tasks for the
partnership. The payments made under the Works Contract into the company’s
bank account had been received by the company acting as agent for the
partnership. This being the case, those payments validly discharged the liability
of the payers.89 The company, acting as agent, had also presented the claim
document under the Works Contract on behalf of the partnership.90 Problems
of title to sue were, in effect, overcome by using the concept of ad hoc agency.
88 McIntosh at para 14, relying on Symington v Campbell (1894) 21 R 434 and Bentley v Macfarlane 1964
SC 76.
89 Para 18.
90 Ibid.
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(b) John Stirling
A year later, Lord Drummond Young decided the case of John Stirling t/a M & S
Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Ltd.91 Stirling, a sole trader, entered
into a construction contract with the defenders, in terms of which Stirling was to
carry out refurbishment works at the defender’s premises in St Annes. Shortly
thereafter, a new company was formed: M & S Contracts Limited. Just as in
McIntosh the intention was that the new company would take over the business of
the partnership, so in Stirling the intention was that the new company would take
over the business of the sole trader. Again, the sole trader’s rights and liabilities
under the construction contract were not validly transferred to the company.
Many of the steps carried out under this contract were carried out in the name
of the company. The company sought to refer the dispute to adjudication, but
was forced to abandon this attempt when the defenders pointed out that it was
not a party to the contract. The sole trader then sought to refer the dispute to
adjudication.
The reported case is, in effect, an action by the sole trader seeking
enforcement of the adjudicator’s decision. Again, the concept of ad hoc agency
was deployed to allow acts of the newly formed company (such as the writing of
letters and submission of invoices) to be identified as acts on behalf of the sole
trader. The fact that cheques had been paid into the company’s bank account, and
not that of the sole trader, was treated by Lord Drummond Young as a “matter of
mere administrative convenience”.92 It was held that a dispute or difference had
indeed existed between the sole trader and the defenders prior to the service of
the notice of adjudication. The defender’s objections to the enforcement of the
adjudicator’s decision were therefore repelled.
(c) Other possible uses of ad hoc agency
InMcIntosh and Stirling, the concept of ad hoc agency was deployed to overcome
errors which had occurred at the time of incorporation of a partnership or sole
trader business into a limited company. Lord Drummond Young offered his
concept for use in other contexts such as group company situations:93
Within groups of companies, it is relatively common to find one company performing
tasks for another company within the group. This may take many different forms; for
present purposes, an example that is relevant is that one company may perform debt
collection functions on behalf of other companies within the group. In such a case,
91 [2007] CSOH 117.
92 Para 28.
93 McIntosh at para 16.
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the debts do not become due to the debt-collecting company; they remain due to the
original contracting party, but the debt-collecting company acts as an agent for the
contracting party in obtaining payment of the debts. . . That will commonly involve
payment of debts into a bank account in the name of the debt-collecting company; the
latter company’s function is merely that of an agent, and the underlying contractual
structures are not affected.
The solution can be applied even more widely:94
Arrangements of this nature are found not only within groups of companies. . . at the
level of natural persons, they are frequently encountered within a family. Nor are
ad hoc agency relationships confined to routine tasks such as the collection of debts;
they may also extend to more complex matters such as conducting negotiations over
the performance of a contract.
(2) Methods of creation of an agency relationship
Agency in Scots law may arise either expressly, through offer and acceptance, or
by implication from facts where the agent begins to act on behalf of the principal
and the principal does not object to this course of conduct.95 In such situations,
the facts provide the basis from which inferences of an intention to be bound can
be made.96 Those inferences relate to both principal and agent: in other words, it
must be clear that both principal and agent possess the intention to be bound.97
Stair emphasised the need for this “core” agreement in relation to the gratuitous
contract of mandate,98 and modern agency law does not differ in this respect. In
the three cases under discussion here, the agency relationship is a type of implied
agreement.99 It is, however, easier to make inferences of consent necessary to
94 Ibid.
95 Barnetson v Petersen Bros (1902) 5 F 86; Bell v Ogilvie (1863) 2 M 336 at 340 per Lord Justice Clerk
Inglis at 340.
96 Barnetson v Petersen Brothers (1902) 5 F 86 at 89 per Lord Trayner; Bank of Scotland v McNeill 1977
SLT (Sh Ct) 2 at 3 per Sheriff Principal Reid.
97 Bank of Scotland v McNeill 1977 SLT (Sh Ct) at 3 per Sheriff Principal Reid.
98 Stair, Inst 1.12.1 and 1.12.3.
99 See Lord Reed in Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd v Scottish Enterprise [2006] CSOH 35 at para 143: “An
agency can arise from the course of conduct by the principal and agent, as a matter of implied
agreement, where each has conducted itself towards the other in such a way that it is reasonable for
the other to infer from that conduct consent to the agency.” Forte and van Niekerk have suggested
a non-consensual model for Scots law: see A D M Forte and J P van Niekerk, “Agency” in K Reid,
R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2006) 246. Whilst examples of non-consensual agency
undoubtedly exist (such as those created by sections 24 and 25(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979),
Forte and van Niekerk’s analysis fails to reflect the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, the agency
relationship is based on consensus between principal and agent. Little evidence from Scottish case-law
is provided by Forte and van Niekerk to support a non-consensual model. By contrast, Scottish cases
in which the contractual (and therefore consensual) nature of agency is emphasised are not difficult
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form a contract where the supposed principal and agent engage in a course of
dealing.100
In the three cases under discussion, there was, of course, no offer and
acceptance between the so-called principal and agent, nor was there what
could be described as a course of dealing. In McIntosh and Stirling the agent
performed a number of acts in the context of a single construction transaction. In
Whitbread, the agent paid (or made repeated attempts to pay) a particular debt.
Lord Drummond Young recognised the limited nature of the purported agency
relationship in Whitbread, describing it as “. . . an agency relationship that comes
into existence for the purpose of a single transaction only”.101
Scots law does recognise agency relationships which are created for limited
purposes: an agent may be a limited or special agent, instructed to carry out a
particular act on behalf of a principal.102 Generally, where the agency relationship
is implied, the standard of proof of agency is high. Agency must be established
as a matter of fact supported by relevant averments, and there is certainly no
presumption in favour of agency.103 This approach to proof appears much stricter
than Lord Drummond Young’s approach. InWhitbread he addressed the issue of
the consent or intention of the parties as follows:104
to find: see Graham & Co v United Turkey Red Co 1922 SC 533 at 546 per Lord Salvesen and at
549 per Lord Ormidale; Lothian v Jenolite Ltd 1969 SC 111 at 120 per Lord Milligan; Trans Barwil
Agencies (UK) Ltd v John S Braid & Co Ltd 1988 SC 222 at 230 per Lord McCluskey; Connolly v
Brown 2007 SLT 778 at para 54 per Lady Dorrian. A similar debate exists in South African law, with
A J Kerr asserting a consensual analysis and J C De Wet and B P Wanda disputing Kerr’s view. See A J
Kerr, The Law of Agency, 4th edn (2006) 5-10 for a useful summary of the debate. The debate cannot
be fully analysed here. Drawing on the approach of the Scottish courts, it is assumed for the purposes
of this article that agency in Scots law is consensual.
100 Bell, Comm I, 510 n 5; Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd v Scottish Enterprise [2006] CSOH 35 at para 143 per
Lord Reed. Even in such cases, an inference is not easily made. There must be an actual course of
dealing, not simply isolated incidents – see Lord Young’s judgment in Morrison v Statter (1885) 12 R
1152 – and the course of dealing must be consistent: see Ferguson v Lillie & Stephen (1864) 2 M 804
at 807 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Inglis).
101 Para 13. Under the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, SI 1993/3053 reg 2(1)
commercial agents must have “continuing authority” to negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on
behalf of the principal. Not having continuing authority, an ad hoc agent could not fall within the
definition of a commercial agent.
102 Bell, Comm I, 507 and 512-515; WM Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 150; L Macgregor,
“Agency and mandate”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2002)
para 55.
103 Eastern Marine Services (and Supplies) Ltd v Dickson Motors Ltd 1981 SC 355 at 357-359 per Lord
Grieve, an approach he later applied in Sao Paolo Alpargatas SA v Standard Chartered Bank Ltd 1985
SLT 433. Lord Grieve’s approach was applied by Sheriff Lothian in Woodchester Equipment Leasing
Ltd v Rafique and Sarwar 1993 SLT (Sh Ct) 26 at 27 by Sheriff Principal Maguire; and in Royal Bank
of Scotland plc v Shanks 1998 SLT 355 at 360 by Lord Penrose. Even where a course of dealing exists,
the standard of proof is also relatively high: seeMorrison v Statter (1885) 12 R 1152.
104 Para 19, head 3.
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It is no doubt true that there was no actual intention on the part of the persons who
issued the cheque that Fairbar should act as agent for Whitbread. Nevertheless, as the
present case illustrates, the acts of large companies are frequently performed by the
relatively junior employees acting under the corporate structures that have been set
up to govern a multiplicity of transactions, with no regard to any particular transaction.
In those circumstances it is in my opinion quite unrealistic to attempt to attribute a
specific intention to any individual or group of individuals. The corporate intention
must be determined objectively, by examining both the individual transaction and the
corporate structures under which it was effected.
Lord Drummond Young’s approach here is unusual. Actions are often used as
evidence of the underlying agreement of the parties. Thus, in the context of a
sale, payment of money or tendering of goods act as evidence of the underlying
intention necessary to form a contract of sale. Yet here, Lord Drummond Young
identifies payment itself as creating the contract of agency. Payment in itself does
not create a contract of agency – it simply acts as evidence from which inferences
of intention can be made.
Although the language used by Lord Drummond Young is suggestive of the
idea of corporate attribution, i.e. that a person’s intentions can be considered
the intentions of a company,105 he avoids identifying the specific person whose
intention has this effect, and why those intentions should be attributed to Fairbar
rather than Whitbread. Rather, he draws inferences from the circumstances as a
whole. He explains:106
Where . . . one person makes payment of another’s debt, he normally does so as the
agent of the debtor for the purpose of that particular transaction . . . That is in my
opinion the natural inference from two facts (i) the existence of a debt owed by a
debtor and (ii) the fact that payment is made in order to discharge that particular debt.
These inferences were sufficient, in his view, to indicate that a relationship of
agency was created: “The obvious inference is accordingly that he makes payment
on behalf of the debtor. That creates the relationship of ad hoc agency.”107
In Whitbread several unsuccessful attempts were made to pay the rent. One
such attempt involved the tendering of a Fairbar cheque which was cashed but
the sums ultimately re-credited, the landlords seeking to avoid the implication of
consent to an assignation. The intention was, clearly, that Fairbar funds should
be used to pay a Whitbread debt.108 In a system such as Scots law where all
individuals have by law a legal power to pay another’s debt (subject to safeguards
105 As explored by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities
Commission [1995] 2 AC 500.
106 Whitbread at para 13.
107 Para 13, emphasis added.
108 See A (2) above.
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for the parties), it cannot be said that such a payment necessarily creates a
relationship of ad hoc agency. It seems, therefore, that recourse to ad hoc agency
was unnecessary in this case.
The objective approach to the ascertainment of intention is again emphasised
by Lord Drummond Young inMcIntosh:109
. . . I am of opinion that a reasonable man in the position of either the first or the
second defenders would construe the claim document as being presented through the
company but acting as agent for the true contracting party, the partnership. As a matter
of commercial reality, that would plainly be a sensible way to proceed, avoiding the
need for a formal assignation but permitting the active trading entity, the company, to
progress matters on behalf of the true contracting party.
That would indeed have been “a sensible approach”, but sensible approaches are
not always taken! The directors of Laurence McIntosh Ltd would no doubt have
been surprised had it been suggested to them that they were in fact acting as
agents for a partnership which, although not dissolved, was inactive, all trading
functions having been transferred to the newly formed company. The use of
ad hoc agency here provided an escape route, bypassing the formal requirements
of assignation. A solution which bypasses entirely the requirements of assignation,
an important part of the law of obligations, is highly questionable.
The objective perspective applied by Lord Drummond Young allowed him
to omit consideration of actual intention. As such, there was no need for
him to address the issue of whether both principal and agent exhibited the
consent necessary to establish agency. Rather than agency being the most likely
interpretation of the facts, it was only one of a number of factual possibilities. It
seems highly likely that none of the actors involved had addressed their minds
to the possibility of agency. In McIntosh and Stirling, for example, the various
actors seem to have been unaware of the legal consequences of incorporation
of a company. Alternatively, they may have been aware but unwilling to devote
the time necessary in order properly to deal with the legal consequences of
incorporation.
Ad hoc agency operates in these cases as a “get out of jail free” card,
available to parties who have failed properly to regulate their legal affairs. What
is of greater concern is the effect this line of cases may have on the general
principles of agency law. Were these cases to be used generally as precedents,
it could threaten the previously established rules for formation of the agency
relationship, undermining the role of consent in that relationship. One might also
109 Para 18. Later in his judgment (para 19) he construes a letter as being sent by the company
Laurence McIntosh Ltd on behalf of the partnership Laurence McIntosh and Sons, commenting
“. . . commercially, that is the obvious and rational interpretation of what happened”.
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question whether this goal of protecting the uninformed is worth the concomitant
distortion of agency principles.
(3) The agent’s authority
Once an agency relationship is constituted, the agent must act within the confines
of his or her authority. The consequences of an agent stepping outside the
boundaries of authority are serious, for example, the agent is unable to conclude
a contract on the principal’s behalf.110 In none of these three cases was there an
express grant of authority, so only implied authority could have been available to
the agent in each case. Of the several types of implied authority111 the one which
seems most appropriate in these circumstances is that which arises because it is
necessary to achieve the object of the agency.112 In Stirling, John Stirling was
both the sole trader and the sole director of the company. The use of ad hoc
agency involves considering Stirling as granting authority, in effect, to himself. In
McIntosh, the same parties were both partners in the partnership and directors
of the company. Again, principal and agent are, in effect, the same parties. This
reasoning is highly artificial and could only be justified by regarding it as a
by-product of separate personality.
Reading Lord Drummond Young’s judgments in McIntosh and Stirling
together, there appear to be limits to the scope of ad hoc agency which have
an impact on the issue of authority. In McIntosh Lord Drummond Young held
that various activities had been performed by the company as agent on behalf of
the partnership. These included payments,113 and also the presentation of a claim
document under the Works Contract.114 In this case, there is no indication that
the scope of ad hoc agency is limited. This can be contrasted with Stirling, where
he indicated that ad hoc agency:115
. . . applies to correspondence, invoices, contractual notices and the like, where no
special formality is expected; where, however, matters enter a formal process such as
litigation or adjudication, formality is expected and the correct party must be named.
He returns to this issue later in his judgment where he discusses a letter giving
notice of an intention to refer a dispute to adjudication:116
110 Morrison v Statter (1885) 12 R 1152 at 1154 per Lord Young.
111 Macgregor (n 102) para 50.
112 Ibid. See also Park v Mood 1919 SLT 170.
113 Para 15.
114 Para 18.
115 Para 16.
116 Para 20.
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This letter is, I think, in a different position from earlier correspondence. It is a notice
of intention to refer a dispute to adjudication. Adjudication is a form of provisional
dispute resolution, and the letter is, accordingly similar in its import to a solicitor’s letter
written prior to litigation. At this stage, and in any subsequent adjudication or court
proceedings, I am of the opinion that an analysis in terms of ad hoc agency is not an
appropriate inference. When litigation or adjudication is threatened, the communing
between the parties take on a formal aspect, and precision is required in the name of
the party making the claim.
It is difficult to reconcile Lord Drummond Young’s approaches in McIntosh and
Stirling. Arguably, the presentation of the claim document under the Works
Contract inMcIntosh was a step involving formality, and yet the issue of whether
it was, as a result, outside the scope of ad hoc agency did not arise. The exact
parameters of this limitation in scope may have to be formulated in future cases.
The practical result is that the ad hoc agent’s authority is more limited than the
normal agent’s authority. It seems that ad hoc agency is indeed a new and different
species of agency.
(4) Acting on behalf of a non-existent principal
In McIntosh, Lord Drummond Young’s solution involved treating the newly
formed company as the agent of a partnership which, although not dissolved,
was inactive. Partnerships which exist under the Partnership Act 1890 do not, of
course, require to be registered before they can in law be considered created.
Cases such as Khan v Miah117 suggest that the partnership is created when the
parties embark on the commercial activity in question. It is relatively common for
such partnerships to cease trading and yet not be dissolved. Had the partnership
been dissolved, this would have led to a more intractable problem. That problem
will be analysed here given that it may have a significant impact on the use of
ad hoc agency in future. To recap, the partnership in McIntosh had not been
dissolved and was thus theoretically able to provide instructions to an agent.
Had the partnership been dissolved, ad hoc agency would have involved the
company as agent acting on behalf of a non-existent principal. The effects of
acting on behalf of a non-existent principal are not fully developed in Scots law.
Certainly, an agent in this situation cannot conclude a contract on the principal’s
behalf and may, in fact, bind himself.118 Nor can a non-existent business entity
ratify: ratification is itself a unilateral juridical act on the part of the principal,
117 [2000] 1 WLR 2123.
118 Macgregor (n 102) para 165; J J Gow, The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland (1964) 528-529;
and see also McMeekin v Easton (1889) 16 R 363, although in a recent case Lord Hodge held that a
solicitor who concluded missives on behalf of a non-existent client was not personally bound under the
missives: Halifax v DLA Piper [2009] CSOH 74. See also Companies Act 2006 s 51, which prevents
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who by the hypothesis does not exist and therefore cannot have legal capacity. As a
result, ad hoc agency is an inappropriate remedy to use where the partnership has
been dissolved to make way for a newly incorporated company: agency principles
do not allow an agent to act on behalf of a non-existent principal.
The Partnership Act 1890 tempers the otherwise significant difficulties caused
by the fact that partnerships are contracts involving delectus personae. In theory,
a partnership is dissolved each time an individual partner leaves the partnership
or dies.119 Not surprisingly, this common law position is almost always amended
in a written partnership agreement, thus allowing the partnership to continue
to trade notwithstanding changes in its membership. Where there is no written
partnership agreement section 38 of the 1890 Act comes into play, providing
partners with limited authority following dissolution of the partnership “ . . . to
wind up the affairs of the partnership, and to complete transactions begun but
unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise”. There is at least
an argument that a newly formed company could benefit from these residual
powers available to partners as agents involved in winding-up the non-existent
partnership.
Although section 38 has been in force for over one hundred years, its
parameters are not at all clear. A natural interpretation of the section limits
the partners’ authority to completing unfinished transactions, but not entering
into new transactions. This interpretation was recently confirmed by Lord Reed,
although he suggested that Scots law could be contrasted with English law in this
respect.120 So ad hoc agency may be unnecessary in cases where a company has
been incorporated to perform the functions of a dissolved partnership. Section
38 of the 1890 Act arguably already provides a solution. Much would depend on
the facts of the case, for example, the timing of the dissolution of the original
partnership. The longer the time which has elapsed between dissolution and the
exercise by the partners of their purported powers, the less likely those powers
promoters concluding binding contracts on behalf of unincorporated companies. The promoter is
personally bound under any purported contracts. In the UK, the company, once formed, cannot ratify
the actions of the promoter, Kelner v Baxter (1866-1867) LR 2 CP 174. Interestingly, the United
Kingdom approach to this question is more strict than that which applies in most other countries both
within and outwith Europe. See D Busch and L Macgregor, “Comparative law evaluation” in Busch
and Macgregor (eds), The Unauthorised Agent: Perspectives from European and Comparative Law
(2009) 385 at 435-438; and D DeMott, “Ratification: useful but uneven” (2009) 17 ERPL 987.
119 See Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Report on Partnership Law (Law Com No 283;
Scot Law Com No 192, 2003) para 2.8.
120 Duncan & Anor v MFV Marigold PD145 and anor [2006] CSOH 128, 2006 SLT 975 at paras 44 and
66. For English law see Re Bourne [1906] 2 Ch 427; Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch
291. Further recent analysis of section 38 was provided in Balmer v HM Advocate 2008 SLT 799,
where the Crown unsuccessfully attempted to use section 38 as a method of extending the life of a
partnership so that indictments could be served on the partners of the now dissolved partnership.
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are to fall within the ambit of section 38: according to Lord Reed the powers exist
for a “temporary” period only.121
Ad hoc agency seems therefore to pose further problems. In Stirling and
McIntosh the principal and agent were, in effect, the same parties. This results
in highly artificial reasoning when analysing the agent’s authority: in effect, the
parties provide themselves with authority. Looking into the future, ad hoc agency
cannot be used where a partnership has been dissolved in order to incorporate a
company given that the principal is non-existent. Section 38 arguably provides a
more appropriate solution in such cases.
(5) Implications for the wider law of agency
In order to be commercially useful, agency as a concept sometimes elides
established rules of the law of contract. An example is the concept of the
undisclosed principal, which flouts fundamental rules of formation of contract.122
The ability to act on behalf of an undisclosed principal is often justified by
reference to its commercial utility.123 It is undoubtedly useful for agency to
be created easily, with little formality, through an implication from facts and
circumstances. It is for consideration however whether theWhitbread,McIntosh
and Stirling judgments take matters too far, setting the bar for implication of an
agency relationship at too low a level.
This is not the first time that agency law has been used as a tool to solve
problems inherent in other areas of law. Examples include the use of Himalaya
clauses124 prior to the enactment of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Agency
reasoning was deployed in order to protect stevedores who were not immediate
parties to a contract containing an exemption clause and therefore could not be
protected by its terms. The stevedore was characterised as a principal benefiting
from a clause entered into by a supposed agent on its behalf. In such cases, the
problem was too rigid adherence to the doctrine of privity of contract. An escape
route was required, and that was found through the law of agency. This escape
route was rendered obsolete when specific legislation in the form of the 1977 Act
was enacted to fill the lacuna in the law.
121 Duncan v MFV Marigold PD145 [2006] CSOH 128, 2006 SLT 975 at para 43.
122 Macgregor (n 102) paras 147-164.
123 F M B Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 19th edn (2010) para 8-071; G H L Fridman,
Agency, 7th edn (1996) 254.
124 See Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446 at 474 per Lord Reid, the name of the
clause being taken from the name of the ship in Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 QB 158. The Privy Council
confirmed the validity of such clauses in The Eurymedon (New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M
Satterthwaite & Co Ltd) [1975] AC 154. The history of this area of law is usefully summarised in
E Macdonald, Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms (2006) 287-290.
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In the three cases under discussion, it is the doctrine of the separate legal
personality of companies which caused what were perceived to be unfair con-
sequences. An “escape route” from that doctrine already exists however. Under
the doctrine of piercing or lifting the corporate veil the UK courts developed
a number of exceptions to the concept of separate legal personality.125 Some of
these have been disapproved126 or marginalised127 but the judgment of the Court
of Appeal delivered by Slade LJ in the leading English case of Adams v Cape
Industries Plc128 suggests that there are still two bases, one general and the other
particular, for piercing the corporate veil. The general exception was described
in the Woolfson case129 by Lord Keith as “the principle that it is appropriate to
pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that
it is a mere façade concealing the true facts”. In none of the three ad hoc agency
cases under discussion was the company concerned a mere sham or façade.
Under the particular or “agency” exception, which was adumbrated in the
Smith, Stone and Knight case in 1939,130 the veil may be pierced where the
company is in reality completely and utterly under the control of a parent
company or some other person and cannot be said to be carrying on its own
business separately from its parent company or the business of that other person.
It has been observed that despite the sporadic application of the case, the weight
of authority in the UK and Australia “does not provide strong support for using
the decision for veil piercing” though it is otherwise in Canada.131 It is clear that
in the Whitbread case, the acts of Fairbar Ltd and Whitbread Group plc were
closely entwined but the Smith, Stone and Knight case was not relied on. In the
McIntosh and Stirling cases, the lack of title to sue stemmed from a botched
transition from partnership or sole trader to corporate status.
Though the judgments in the three ad hoc agency cases were not characterised
by counsel or judge as a piercing of the corporate veil, it may be that that was their
true effect. Yet such an expansion of the piercing the veil doctrine runs counter
to the recent tendency of UK courts (in e.g. Woolfson and Adams) to limit the
125 See the valuable overview in MMoore, “ ‘A temple built on faulty foundations’: piercing the corporate
veil and the legacy of Salomon v Salomon” [2006] JBL 180.
126 See e.g the “interests of justice” exception in Creasey v Breachwood Motors [1993] BCLC 480,
overruled in Ord v Belhaven Pubs [1998] BCLC 447.
127 See e.g. the “single economic unit” exception in DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets LBC
[1976] 1 WLR 852.
128 [1990] Ch 433.
129 Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council 1978 SC (HL) 90 at 96
130 Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All ER 116.
131 See A Hargovan and J Harris, “Piercing the corporate veil in Canada: a comparative analysis” [2007]
Company Lawyer 58 which also argues that “the use of so-called ‘agency principles’ to pierce the
corporate veil has little to do with traditional agency law”.
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doctrine to cases where special circumstances exist indicating that the company
concerned is a sham. Given that the lengthy Companies Act 2006 has not ex-
panded the categories in which lifting the veil is possible, is ad hoc agency actually
needed in order to supplement or extend the existing doctrine of lifting the veil?
How should one evaluate the effect which the new doctrine of ad hoc agency
might have on the law of agency? The parties who ultimately benefited from the
new doctrine may not have fully understood the implications of incorporation.
There is no reason to suppose, however, that the businesses in question lacked
legal advice. If they received negligent advice from their solicitors (as was argued
in McIntosh),132 then they are likely to have a relevant claim against their
solicitors in negligence. Additionally, one might argue that the separate legal
personality of a company is hardly novel, and its implications are known to many
non-legally qualified business persons. Looking at matters from the opposite
perspective, there is no doubt that the contractual counterparties, Balfour Beatty
and Westminster, sought to take advantage of a mistake which had been made.
Whether that mistake was excusable is less clear. The facts of McIntosh and
Stirling do not seem to amount to a pressing case for the development of a new
doctrine. In the case of Whitbread, as has been argued in Part B of this article, a
solution was already in existence but was not used.
As is often the case, the “quick-fix” solution may have unforeseen and
undesirable results. Some of those results have been explored above, and others
may arise. One such issue is the extent of the ad hoc agent’s fiduciary duties.
Decided case-law suggests that an agent who, because of the limited nature of his
authority, is classed as a limited rather than a general agent, has limited fiduciary
duties. Is an ad hoc agent a limited agent, and thus able to benefit from limited
fiduciary duties? In the cases under discussion, the companies were related, and
it is unlikely that principal and agent would enter into a dispute of this type.
However, Lord Drummond Young offered his solution for use in wider contexts.
These potential problems would have to be fully considered before the concept
could be deployed more broadly across commercial law.
D. CONCLUSION
In summary, we conclude that the new doctrine of ad hoc agency, which has
not yet “caught on”,133 should (to change the metaphor) be nipped in the bud
132 Para 5.
133 Apart from the three cases decided by Lord Drummond Young discussed above, at the time of writing
the doctrine of ad hoc agency has been referred to in only one other case and then only in passing
references: see Fleming Builders Ltd v Hives [2008] CSOH 103 at paras 102 and 106 per Lord
Menzies.
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before it does. In its origins it was unnecessary because of the existing general
rule empowering a third party to pay another’s debt subject to safeguards for the
parties, especially the creditor’s autonomy. Moreover there are rules requiring the
debtor to recompense a third party payer on the basis of unjustified enrichment
or negotiorum gestio and there is no need to treat the debtor as a principal bound
by an implied contract of agency to reimburse the third party as his ad hoc agent.
From its origins in Whitbread, the concept of ad hoc agency has been applied
in order to assist a party who has failed to take the necessary steps in order to
transfer its legal rights on incorporation as a company. It is unclear whether these
cases involved an injustice requiring the introduction of a novel agency doctrine.
That doctrine is open to criticism on various grounds outlined above including
the creation of unnecessary conceptual difficulties such as doubts about, firstly,
the formation of the agency contract, and secondly the scope of the ad hoc agent’s
authority; problems concerning the non-existent principal; and inconsistency with
the recent case-law on piercing the corporate veil.
